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Abstract
We report on an experiment designed to study a dynamic model of quantity com-
petition where firms continuously revise their production targets prior to the play of
the “one-shot” game. We investigate how the observability of rival firm’s plans and the
technology for implementation of revised actions affect market competitiveness. Under a
real-time revision game where payoffs are determined only by the quantities prepared at
the end, play converges to the Cournot-Nash output when rival’s plans are unobservable.
If plans cannot be hidden from competitors, choices are even more competitive than the
static Nash equilibrium, thereby showing a negative value of information with lower prof-
its. With stochastic revision, where opportunities to revise arrive according to a Poisson
process and the quantities selected at the last opportunity are implemented, collusion is
much frequent. This shows, more generally, that cooperation can be observed even when
individuals interact only once.
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1 Introduction
Strategic interactions are typically modeled using simultaneous one-shot games in economics.
Even though the interaction might happen only once and payoffs are realized through a
one-time play of the game, the actions chosen by the players are normally the result of a
long preparation process. Static one-shot models fail to capture this underlying (and often
complex) dynamics that are generally present in the process of deliberation before players
finally “settle” for an action choice. In this paper, we analyze a dynamic model of quantity
competition, where firms can continuously adjust their production targets during a revision
phase that precedes the one-time play of the game.
Announcing plans and revision of production targets happens in the production industry
where firms compete in quantity.1 Although production is made at the end, there are several
factors that might influence the final quantity of output produced. Demand and cost uncer-
tainty, information about competitor’s planned production, capacity constraints and other
reasons might make the final choice of production different from the initial plans. We use
a laboratory experiment to analyze the impact of introducing action revision on the final
quantities implemented and on market competitiveness in a Cournot duopoly. In the labora-
tory, one can not only observe and control key variables, including the information feedback
available to players, but also replicate a given scenario multiple times and make causal in-
ferences. We study two types of games that differ in the technology of implementation of
revised actions:
• Real Time Revision- Firms continuously announce quantities that they desire to pro-
duce. Player payoffs are determined only by the choices selected at the end of the
revision phase.
• Stochastic Revision- Although firms post their desired quantities in real time, opportu-
nities to revise choices arrive according to a synchronous Poisson process and players’
payoffs are given by the desired quantities selected at the last revision opportunity.
The stochastic revision game provides a stylized representation of situations where com-
munication and implementation occur at different times, possibly due to delays. It models
the inefficiencies or imperfections in implementing the intended choices. On the other hand,
real time revision game implements intended actions without any imperfection. Stochastic
1It is very common to announce plans for the production of cars few months ahead of actual production
in the US motor vehicle and aircraft industries. The trade journal Ward’s Automotive Reports publishes the
firm’s announcements of their plans for monthly U.S. production of cars as early as six months before actual
production and these plans could be continuously revised until the end of the target month.
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revision games are theoretically introduced in Kamada and Kandori (2015) where the au-
thors show that the addition of the revision phase can widen the set of achievable payoffs
as compared to the static game without any such pre-play phase. Calcagno et al. (2014)
demonstrate that the revision phase can narrow down the set of achievable payoffs in games
of coordination. Doyle and Snyder (1999) study the role of revision phase as information
sharing tool using panel data from the U.S. automobile industry. In a quantity setting game,
Caruana and Einav (2008) develop a theoretical model of real time revision in quantity choices
with convex adjustment costs.2
Revision of actions is a phenomenon that is practiced in some of the financial markets as
well, such as Nasdaq and Euronext. Prior to opening of the market, participants are allowed
to submit orders which can be continuously withdrawn and changed until the opening time.
During the entire preopening phase, these orders and resulting prices are publicly posted
but only the orders that are still posted at the opening time are binding and are executed.
Traders do not always manage to withdraw and submit new orders simultaneously due to
technological and other reasons. While these preopening mechanisms are theoretically studied
in Vives (1995) and Calcagno and Lovo (2010), empirical investigations are documented in
Biais et al. (1999) and Cao et al. (2000). Biais et al. (2014) experimentally analyze how to
design preopening mechanisms that facilitate coordination on high equilibrium liquidity and
gains from trade.
By varying the assumption on the ability to observe rival’s plans, we are also able to
answer whether market competitiveness is different with observable plans than when rivals
plans are hidden. Is information valuable in raising firms’ profits? Previous literature has
explored the value of information as well as the incentives to share information in oligopolistic
markets. See Fried (1984), Sakai (1985), Gal-Or (1985, 1987, 1988), Raith (1996), Einy et
al. (2002), Myatt and Wallace (2015) for theoretical models in this field. Information here
typically refers to the knowledge about the underlying demand or cost parameter. Some
studies have investigated the impact of asymmetries in information and cost in experimental
duopolies (Mason et al. (1992), Mason and Phillips (1997), Fonseca et al. (2005)). In the
context of learning in Cournot oligopoly, Huck et al. (1999) study experimental markets where
they vary information about demand and cost conditions as well as about the quantities and
profits of other firms across decision rounds. In contrast to the above papers, information in
our model refers to the observability of rival’s prepared actions or production targets during
2As our focus is on the role of revision technology on the market competitiveness, we abstract away from
any explicit costs of quantity adjustment. Revisions are, however, costly in the stochastic revision game as
choices are binding with some probability. Commitment is introduced in our model by the choice of the
revision technology.
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the revision phase.
Although related to cheap-talk, the real time revision phase differs considerably from
the former in that no external language of communication is used during the revision phase.
Players are allowed to signal their intentions or desired choice of actions, but they cannot send
any message or participate in any other explicit form of communication. For the stochastic
revision games, although the revisions are costless and there is no explicit cost of revising
quantities, players face exogenous uncertainty about the effectiveness of the revision. Choices
are now binding with some exogenous probability.
Real time revision mechanism has been investigated experimentally in the context of
public good provision (Dorsey (1992), Goren et al. (2003, 2004), Duffy et al. (2007), Kurzban
et al. (2001)) and coordination in a minimum-effort game (Deck and Nikiforakis (2012)). In
contrast, we study the effect of both real time revision and stochastic revision in a quantity-
setting game. We are unaware of any paper that analyzes stochastic revision in the laboratory.
The Cournot duopoly game can be used to study cooperation between two individuals,
similar to the prisoner’s dilemma game.3 There is a tension between what is efficient for
the industry and what is individually best given that the other firm chooses the cooperative
action. This allows us to interpret our research question more generally as follows: in the
absence of explicit communication, can cooperation be observed when individuals interact
only once?4
There have been numerous experiments conducted on Cournot duopolies and the basic
conclusion is that while a random matching scheme results in play converging to the Cournot-
Nash equilibrium, some degree of collusion often arises in repeated Cournot settings with a
fixed pair of participants (Fouraker and Siegel (1963), Holt (1985), Huck et al. (2001), Huck
et al. (2004)).5 These studies however generally do not allow communication between the
players.
Balliet (2010) provides a meta-analysis of communication and cooperation in social dilem-
mas and concludes that there is a large positive effect of communication on cooperation in
these situations. Non-binding pre-play communication (or cheap talk) has been shown to
facilitate collusive play in oligopoly markets, mostly in repeated settings ((Friedman (1967),
Daughety and Forsythe (1987a, 1987b), Brown-Kruse et al. (1993), Fonseca and Normann
3The unique equilibrium outcome is inefficient in the Cournot game as there exist other action profiles that
have higher joint profits than under the choice of Nash equilibrium actions.
4The interaction among players occurs only once in the sense that the payoffs are determined by the
one-time play of the game among the players.
5For an overview of papers employing laboratory experiments to study oligopoly markets, see Potters and
Suetens (2013).
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(2012), Cooper and Kuhn (2014), Waichman et al. (2014)).6 As opposed to cheap talk, we
study the role of intention signaling in oligopoly markets in real time as players prepare their
actions in one-shot games.
2 Markets, Treatments, and Theoretical Predictions
The experiment uses the Cournot duopoly model of quantity competition. There are two
firms, firm 1 and firm 2, producing and selling a homogeneous product in a market. Each
firm’s decision is to choose an output level, qi ∈ [0, 50]. They face a linear inverse demand:
P (Q) = max{50−Q, 0}, Q = q1 + q2, (1)
while the cost function for each firm is given by
Ci(qi) = 2qi, i = 1, 2. (2)
In this static model where firms decide simultaneously, the Nash equilibrium play implies
qCNEi = 16, i = 1, 2 and the joint profit maximization implies an aggregate market quantity of
QJPM = 24. On a symmetric Cournot market, the symmetric joint profit maximizing output
is qJPMi = 12, i = 1, 2. The perfectly competitive Walrasian output is q
PCW
i = 24, i = 1, 2
where price equals the marginal cost. With perfect collusion, market price is 18. On the
other hand, at the Nash equilibrium, price is 26. Market profit equals 512 under perfectly
collusive play and 576 if firms choose the Cournot-Nash quantity.
A standard measure of collusion consists in measuring the extent to which firms manage
to increase their profits above the Nash equilibrium profits and come closer to cartel profits
(Holt (1995), Argenton and Mu¨ller (2012)). The collusion index (θ) is defined as follows:
θ =
pi − piCNE
piJPM − piCNE ,
where pi stands for the market profits actually achieved, piCNE is the market profit at the
Nash equilibrium, and piJPM stands for the maximum possible market profits.7
A planning phase is added to the static model described above where firms can revise
their production targets. Three markets are considered that differ in the assumption regarding
the observability of rival’s revised plans and the type of technology used to implement the
6Few studies have shown positive effect of cheap talk on cooperation in social dilemmas under one-shot
setting with random rematching of participants. See Duffy and Feltovich (2002) and Palfrey et al. (2015).
7θ = 1 at the perfectly collusive individual output of 12 and θ = 0 if both firms choose 16 each.
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revisions of quantity choices by the firms.
Baseline Market: Hidden Plans
In this baseline market, the Cournot game is played at time T . However, firms could adjust
their quantity choices in a costless manner in real time from t = 0 to t = T . The output
choice that is actually implemented is the one that corresponds to time t = T (perfect imple-
mentation), but, the firms are unable to observe their competitor’s choices and adjustments
over time. Only at the very end does a firm get to observe the implemented choice of the
other firm. With hidden plans, there is no informational feedback during the planning phase.
Thus, this scenario is strategically equivalent to the static simultaneous-move Cournot game.
The static game is implemented in this manner instead of the usual one-shot version to make
every aspect comparable to the other markets, except for the observability of competitor’s
choices. In this game, similar to the one-shot game, there is an unique Nash equilibrium of
q∗i = 16, i = 1, 2 at time T . This gives rise to the first hypothesis as follows.
Hypothesis 1. The collusion index equals zero in the baseline market.
Real Time Revision Market
In this market, firms can not only adjust their quantity choices in real time until time reaches
T but also observe the output revisions of their competitor in real time. Again the output
choices corresponding to time t = T are implemented. Since the choices at any time t < T
are not binding, the entire phase [0, T ) constitutes a “cheap talk” period where the language
of communication is the intended quantity that a firm wishes to produce at time T . There
is still a unique Nash equilibrium prediction of q∗i = 16, i = 1, 2 at time T regardless of the
dynamics of revisions during t ∈ [0, T ). This is because at time T there is no future and
the unique mutual best response is at the quantity level of 16. This leads to the following
hypothesis.
Hypothesis 2. The extent of collusion is the same between baseline and real time revision
markets.
Stochastic Revision Market
Firms submit their intended quantity choices “continuously” in this market and a synchronous
stochastic process determines which quantity choices are implemented at time T . Specifically,
there is a Poisson process with an arrival rate λ > 0 defined over the time interval [0, T ) and
the intended choices corresponding to the last time the process takes place are implemented
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at time T . Both the firms observe all the past events including the “continuous” revision
plans. Thus, while there is perfect observability of rival’s prepared plans, the implementation
of adjusted choices is imperfect, unlike the real time revision market.
The revision phase [0, T ) is now different from a “cheap talk” period because revisions are
now binding with some exogenous probability. In this game of stochastic revision, Kamada
and Kandori (2015) identify symmetric equilibria that use trigger strategies.8 Each of these
equilibria prescribes an action path q(t) which implies that when a revision opportunity
arrives at time t, players are supposed to choose the quantity q(t), given that there have
been no deviations in the past. If any player deviates and does not choose q(t), then in the
future players choose the Nash equilibrium quantity of the Cournot game, whenever a revision
opportunity arrives. They identify the optimal symmetric trigger strategy equilibrium that
achieves (ex ante) the highest payoffs in this class of equilibrium.
Kamada and Kandori (2015) characterize action paths that are continuous in time and
lie in [12, 16], i.e., it never prescribes a quantity that is lower than the individual collusive
outcome of qm = 242 = 12 and higher than the Nash equilibrium output of 16. At the
beginning of the revision phase, players start with quantities lower than the static Nash
equilibrium output of 16 and remains there till a cut-off time. From the cut-off time onward,
players start adjusting their quantities upwards.
While there are multiple trigger strategy equilibria in this game, at the optimal symmet-
ric trigger strategy equilibrium, players start with the best symmetric action which is the
individual collusive output of 12. They do not revise their quantity plans (even if revision
opportunities arrive) till a cut-off time. After this time, they choose the optimal path given
by q(t) whenever a revision opportunity arrives. The closer the revision opportunity is to the
end of the revision phase, the closer the revised quantity is to the Nash equilibrium output
of 16. When the revision phase is over and the game ends, the quantities chosen at the last
revision opportunity are implemented.9
As the quantities implemented are determined by the last time the Poisson process takes
place and not by the choices prepared at the end of the revision phase, these equilibria
generally predict lower levels of output to be chosen (in expectation) than the Cournot-Nash
equilibrium and hence, the following hypothesis is obtained.
Hypothesis 3. The extent of collusion is higher in the stochastic revision market than
8Kamada and Kandori (2015) analyze a general class of games that satisfy a set of conditions. The
Cournot duopoly game that is studied here satisfies all these conditions. Kamada and Kandori (2015) assume
continuous action spaces. In the experiments, subjects could choose any quantity in [0, 50] with increments of
0.1, which is “almost” continuous.
9For calculation of the optimal trigger strategy equilibrium path using differential equation and other
details, see Kamada and Kandori (2015).
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either baseline or real time revision markets.
The characteristics of the three markets are summarized in Table 1.
Market Rival’s Plans Revision Implementation
Baseline Hidden Perfect
Real Time Revision Observable Perfect
Stochastic Revision Observable Imperfect
Table 1: Market Characteristics
3 Methods and Procedures
The experiments were conducted at the Social Science Experimental Laboratory (SSEL),
California Institute of Technology (Caltech) using the Multistage software package. Subjects
were recruited from a pool of volunteer subjects, maintained by the SSEL. Eight sessions
were run, using a total of 96 subjects. No subject participated in more than one session. A
total of three treatments were generated, each with a revision phase of 120 seconds: baseline
(two sessions), real time revision (two sessions), and stochastic revision (four sessions).10
On arrival, instructions were read aloud.11 Subjects interacted anonymously with each
other through computer terminals. There was no possibility of any kind of communication
between the subjects, except as explained in the instructions. Each session had exactly 12
participants and it lasted between 45 and 50 minutes. Average earnings were US$19. Each
subject also received an additional US$5 show-up fee.
In the instructions subjects were told that they were to act as a seller which, together
with another seller, produces the same product in a market and that, in each round, both
have to decide what quantity to produce. They were also informed that every round they
would be matched to a new participant from the room and thus, they would not be matched
with the same person ever again. This was done to eliminate the reputation and super-game
effects which might occur with repeated play. Each session consisted of eleven rounds.
Participants were provided with a profit sheet and a profit calculator. The profit sheet
showed the profits a seller would earn for every possible combination of integer choices (from 0
to 30) by her and the other seller. For integer numbers above 30 or non-integer numbers, they
had to use the profit calculator provided on their screens. Each seller could choose an output
10In two sessions, the arrival rate of revision opportunities was equal to 0.04 per second while in the other
two sessions, this rate was 0.02 per second.
11A copy of the instructions is provided in the Appendix.
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level from the set {0, 0.1, 0.2, ..., 49.8, 49.9, 50} and the payoffs were generated according to
the demand and cost functions given in equations (1) and (2). The payoffs were measured in a
fictitious currency unit called points and subjects were told that at the end of the experiment
they would be paid the US Dollars equivalent of the sum of points earned by them across all
rounds. This USD equivalent was determined by using an exchange rate from 150:1.
Subjects were informed that every round they would have 120 seconds to decide the
quantity to be produced. At the beginning of this “120 seconds” round they were asked to
enter an initial tentative quantity from {0, 0.1, 0.2, ..., 49.8, 49.9, 50}. Once all the participants
in the room made an initial choice, the round started in real time. In the baseline treatment,
a subject only observed her own tentative quantity. Whenever there was a change in the
tentative quantity made by the subject, the screen was updated along with the time at which
the change took place. At the end of the revision phase each subject observed not only her
tentative quantity but also the quantity of the other seller as well as the profits earned for
that round.
In the real time revision treatment, a participant gets to see her own tentative quantity,
the tentative quantity chosen by her competitor as well as the tentative profits. The screen
was updated whenever either of the two matched participants decided to change their re-
spective quantities. Subjects were also told that the word “tentative” reflects the fact that
if there were no more changes then the last entry shows the final quantity choice and the
amount of profits earned by them for that round.
In the stochastic revision treatment, the screen was updated for two separate reasons.
First, there was an update if any of the two matched participants changed their respective
tentative quantities. This was shown as an “unstarred” entry on the screen. The second
type of update was shown with a “starred” entry and it marked the occurrence of an “event”
that was responsible for the final quantity choices in a round. Specifically, the final choices
and profits for a round were given by the tentative quantities and profits corresponding to
the last “starred” entry on the screen. For each pair of participants, the occurrence of this
event was decided using a random draw of an integer from an uniform distribution. Thus,
the inter-arrival time between the occurrence of this event follows a geometric distribution
which is an approximation to the exponential distribution in continuous time.
The user interface or screen display for each treatment is provided in Appendix C.
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4 Experimental Results
Comparison of Quantities and Extent of Collusion
The essential statistics is summarized in Tables 2 and 3. Table 2 shows, for each round,
the average individual quantities implemented for each treatment. The number of instances
where a market achieved the perfectly collusive output of 24 for each treatment is shown in
Table 3, which also provides the median collusion index across treatments.
The average quantities selected in the baseline treatment converge to 16, which is the
Cournot-Nash equilibrium. The median and mode are exactly equal to 16 in most of the
rounds. Over all rounds, only one out of the 132 markets achieve perfect collusion (see
Table 3). The median collusion index is zero when considering the last five rounds and all
rounds together. Analyzing each round separately, we find that the collusion index cannot
be statistically distinguished from zero. The p-values from a two-sided Mann-Whitney U
test are > 0.1 for each round.12 Thus, supporting the first hypothesis, we have the following
result.
Result 1. The average quantity equals the Cournot-Nash output and collusion index is
zero in the baseline market.
In contrast, markets are more competitive under real time revision than under baseline
treatment. The modal individual quantity chosen is 18 in nine of the eleven rounds and
median choice is 18 in the last five rounds (see Table 2). In fact, 18 is the best-response
to the rival’s choice of 12. While a total of 7 markets achieve perfect collusion, the median
collusion index is negative when considering the last five rounds. Table 4 presents the results
from round-by-round two-sided Mann-Whitney U test of equality of collusion index between
treatments. A comparison of the market collusion index for each round separately is preferred
as observations are independent.13 The difference between baseline and real time revision
starts becoming significant in the latter half of the experiment when subjects have gathered
a lot of experience.
Thus, rejecting Hypothesis 2, we have the following result.
Result 2. The real time revision market results in higher individual quantity and lower
collusion index than baseline market.
Table 2 shows that the modal individual quantity chosen in the majority of the rounds
in the stochastic market is 12, the symmetric joint profit maximizing output. The median
and mean choices decline over rounds as subjects gather more experience. This is in contrast
12The p-values are: 0.17, 0.17, 0.3, 0.17, 0.97, 0.31, 0.75, 0.5, 0.75, 0.98, 0.75 for rounds 1-11 respectively.
13We use this method of statistical test as individual quantities or average (across rounds) market observa-
tions based on pairs are not independent variables.
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Perfect Collusion Median Collusion Index (θ)
Rounds Baseline Real Time Stochastic Baseline Real Time Stochastic
1-6 172
5
72
26
144 0.18 0.23 0.23
7-11 060
2
60
37
120 0.00 -0.49 0.44
All 1132
7
132
63
264 0.02 -0.13 0.44
Table 3: Instances of perfect collusion and median collusion index across treatments.
Round Real Time vs. Baseline Stochastic vs. Baseline Stochastic vs. Real Time
1 0.64 0.13 0.27
2 0.75 0.83 0.62
3 0.75 0.88 0.91
4 0.22 0.82 0.34
5 0.52 0.56 0.21
6 0.73 0.55 0.43
7 0.05 0.45 0.04
8 0.80 0.05 0.09
9 0.02 0.05 0.00
10 0.13 0.01 0.00
11 0.02 0.04 0.00
Table 4: P -values from round-by-round two-sided Mann-Whitney U test of equality of collu-
sion index between treatments.
12
to both the baseline and real time revision markets. Out of 264 markets in the stochastic
revision treatment, 63 attain the perfectly collusive output with the median collusion index
being significantly positive. The p-values from difference in collusion index across treatments
(Stochastic vs. Baseline and Stochastic vs. Real Time Revision) are significant in the latter
half. Hence, supporting the third hypothesis, the following result is obtained.
Result 3. The stochastic revision market results in lower individual quantity and higher
collusion index than either baseline or real time revision market.
Dynamics of Quantity Adjustment
Tables 5 and 6 provides the frequency distribution of the initial, implemented and final
individual quantities across rounds for each of the three treatments. The implemented and
final quantities coincide for baseline and real time revision markets. The mean, median and
modal individual quantity over the revision phase of 120 seconds is depicted in Figure 1.
With no information feedback on rival’s revised production targets, play is fairly stable over
the revision phase in baseline market.14
In the real time revision market, an overwhelming number of initial quantities is around
the individually collusive output of 12, however, only few of the final quantities are near 12.
From initial to final, the instances of output near 12 drops from 88 to 42 out of 144 in rounds
1-6 and even more drastically, from 76 to 14 out of 120. Figure 1 shows that the median as
well as mode stays at low values (lower than the static Nash output) for most of the revision
phase. At the very end, just before the revision phase ends, there is a jump in the modal
tentative quantity to 18 (and median rises to 18 in the last five rounds as well). A round-by-
round Wilcoxon signed-rank test shows that final tentative quantities are significantly higher
than the initial prepared ones.15 In our model, an output of 18 is the best response to rival’s
choice of 12. This suggests that subjects revise their production target at the very end of the
revision phase after indicating an intention to produce the collusive output of 12. When they
revise, subjects tend to adjust the quantity upwards as they best respond to rival’s currently
prepared choice of 12.16
The overall dynamics follow a non-monotonic pattern in the stochastic revision market.
Quantity choices start high, with median being around 15. As the revision phase progresses,
quantity is adjusted downwards, especially in the last five rounds. The tentative quantity
14A round-by-round Wilcoxon signed-rank test of equality of initial and final quantities reveals that the
number of pairs with no ties is not large enough, especially in the last five rounds.
15P-values from two-sided test are 0.063, 0.056, 0.075, 0.010, 0.024 in rounds 7-11 (last five rounds) respec-
tively.
16Further statistical validation of best response behavior is provided at the end of this section.
13
stabilizes for a while before rising upwards towards the static Nash output of 16 as the re-
vision phase approaches it’s end. Unlike the real time revision market, the quantity choices
implemented for the round are determined by the last time the opportunity to revise arrived.
This feature most likely implements an quantity that is lower than the static Nash of 16. The
modal choice of 12 reveals that several choices of 12 are also implemented in the stochastic
revision market. This explains the high collusion index observed in these markets in com-
parison to the other two treatments. A round-by-round Wilcoxon signed-rank test shows
that while there is no difference between initial and final tentative quantities, implemented
quantities are significantly lower than initially prepared ones.17
The median and modal choices in the stochastic revision market also imply that several
participants in fact behaved similar to the trigger strategy equilibrium path identified in the
theoretical model of Kamada and Kandori (2015). Players start with quantities that are lower
than the static Nash equilibrium of 16 and they remain there till a cut-off time. After the
cut-off time, players adjust their quantities upwards, approaching static Nash as the revision
phase comes to an end.
Examining pair level data, we also observed that there were only a handful of instances
of endogenous Stackelberg leadership. This is in line with previous studies that find hardly
any evidence for such behavior in related oligopoly markets (Huck et al. (2002), Fonseca et
al. (2005)).
Table 7 gives the percentage of times for which there is no revision in tentative quantity as
well as the percent of upward and downward output adjustments for initial and final revision
in the real time revision and stochastic revision markets.18 Initial revision is given by the
first response to competitor’s tentative quantity at time t = 0 and is calculated as the first
changed quantity if t < 10, or the tentative quantity at t = 10 which equals the quantity
at t = 0 if there is no change. Final revision is calculated as the last changed quantity if
t > 110, or the tentative quantity at t = 110 if there is no change in the last ten seconds.
During the initial ten seconds, not much activity takes place in the real time revision
market, with no change in quantity in more than 80% of the instances. There is a tendency
to adjust quantity downwards in a significant number of cases in the stochastic revision
market (around 28% of the observations). In terms of final revision, play is far more stable in
stochastic revision market than real time revision market. In the last five rounds, subjects do
17P-values from two-sided test of equality of initial and final quantities are 0.27, 0.4, 0.681, 0.646, 0.478 in
rounds 7-11 (last five rounds) respectively. On the other hand, in eight of the eleven rounds, the difference
between initial and implemented quantities are statistically significant. The p-values from two-sided test are
0.555, 0.036, 0.029, 0.08, 0.078, 0.052, 0.069, 0.067, 0.114, 0.045, 0.174 in rounds 1-11 respectively.
18Given that there is no information feedback about rival’s quantity adjustments in the baseline market, we
focus on the other two markets here.
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Baseline Real Time Revision Stochastic Revision
Qty. Initial Final Initial Final Initial Implemented Final
[0, 11] 3 1 2 2 9 3 2
(11, 13] 31 25 88 42 91 78 64
(13, 15] 34 37 5 21 51 66 62
(15, 17] 58 63 7 17 36 85 95
(17, 19] 13 15 3 48 21 24 37
(19, 50] 5 3 39 14 80 34 28
nobs. 144 144 144 144 288 288 288
Median 15.5 16 12 16 15 15 16
nobs.: Number of observations.
Table 5: Frequency distribution of initial, implemented and final individual quantity- Rounds
1-6.
Baseline Real Time Revision Stochastic Revision
Qty. Initial Final Initial Final Initial Implemented Final
[0, 11] 1 0 1 0 4 0 0
(11, 13] 7 7 76 14 91 114 62
(13, 15] 19 21 6 12 33 33 37
(15, 17] 82 82 13 32 19 48 71
(17, 19] 11 10 2 48 50 32 55
(19, 50] 0 0 22 14 43 13 15
nobs. 120 120 120 120 240 240 240
Median 16 16 12 18 15 14 16
nobs.: Number of observations.
Table 6: Frequency distribution of initial, implemented and final individual quantity- Rounds
7-11.
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Figure 1: Individual quantity over the revision phase within a round- mean, median and
mode.
16
Real Time Revision Stochastic Revision
Rounds ↓ No ↑ nobs. ↓ No ↑ nobs.
Initial Revision
1-6 4.86 86.11 9.03 144 13.19 77.08 9.73 288
7-11 5.00 82.50 12.50 120 27.09 57.08 15.83 240
Final Revision
1-6 13.89 45.14 40.97 144 8.68 73.96 17.36 288
7-11 10.83 35.00 54.17 120 9.17 59.58 31.25 240
↓: Downward adjustment of tentative quantity.
No: No change in tentative quantity.
↑: Upward adjustment of tentative quantity.
Table 7: Incidence of initial and final revisions (in percentages).
not change their tentative quantity in 60% of the cases under stochastic revision as opposed
to 35% under real time revision market. Individuals adjust their quantities upwards in more
than 50% of the instances during the last five rounds in real time revision market. Although
it is less severe, upward revision is still a phenomenon that is observed in stochastic revision
market as well.
Thus, summarizing the dynamics of quantity adjustment across markets, we have the
following result.
Result 4. Prepared quantities are fairly stable in the baseline market. Real time revision
markets are characterized by drastic upward adjustment in quantity at the very end of the re-
vision phase. In stochastic revision markets, quantities start high, with downward adjustment
in the course of the revision phase, and approach the static best response of 16 as revision
phase nears the end.
The adjustment in quantity during the revision phase can be explained using one of the
following two behaviors. The first one is the best-response behavior where an individual
adjusts her quantity towards the level that is a best response to her competitor’s selected
desired quantity at time t − 1. The second type of behavior is imitation in which case a
subject tries to “match” the output level of her competitor at time t − 1. Accordingly, the
following model of the adjustment process is estimated19:
qti − qt−1i = β0 + β1(rt−1i − qt−1i ) + β2(qt−1j − qt−1i ),
where qti is the tentative quantity posted by subject i at time t, r
t−1
i is the subject i’s best
19The standard errors are clustered at the subject level.
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Real Time Revision Stochastic Revision
Rounds β0 β1 β2 nobs. β0 β1 β2 nobs.
1-6 2.41 0.07 0.97*** 20 -0.17 0.59*** 0.51*** 66
(1.81) (0.29) (0.29) (0.94) (0.13) (0.07)
7-11 1.35 0.03 1.15*** 21 0.35 0.54*** 0.39*** 103
(1.24) (0.46) (0.18) (0.55) (0.08) (0.08)
All 2.16** -0.04 1.06*** 41 0.21 0.58*** 0.42*** 169
(1.00) (0.19) (0.16) (0.53) (0.08) (0.07)
nobs.: Number of observations with change in tentative quantity.
Table 8: OLS estimation of initial revision behavior (clustered standard errors in parentheses).
*, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels.
response to the competitor’s tentative quantity at time t− 1 and qt−1j denotes the tentative
quantity of the competitor at time t − 1. An individual who strictly plays a myopic best
response (imitation) will have β1 = 1(β2 = 1).
The estimation results are displayed in Tables 8 and 9, for initial and final revisions,
respectively. In real time revision market, imitation significantly explains behavior for the
initial quantity adjustment. On the other hand, both β1 and β2 are highly significant in
stochastic revision market, showing heterogeneous behavior- use of both imitation and best-
response. Table 9 reveals that it is best response behavior that primarily explains the final
quantity adjustment during the end of the revision phase. The above discussion leads to the
final result as follows.
Result 5. While imitation predominantly explains the initial adjustments in quantity
during the revision phase, firms tend to best respond towards the end of the revision phase.
5 Conclusion
Using a laboratory experiment, this study investigated the effect of observing competitor’s
plans and different forms of pre-play revisions in two-player dynamic game of quantity com-
petition. With real time revision of quantity choices where payoffs are determined by the
action choices at the end, play converges to the static Cournot-Nash equilibrium output with
hidden plans. With perfect monitoring of competitor’s quantity adjustments, final output
choices are significantly more competitive than Cournot-Nash output. Choices are closer
to the joint profit maximizing choice including several instances of perfect collusion under
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Real Time Revision Stochastic Revision
Rounds β0 β1 β2 nobs. β0 β1 β2 nobs.
1-6 0.18 0.80*** 0.17*** 79 1.33** 0.55*** 0.15 75
(0.47) (0.08) (0.05) (0.52) (0.13) (0.15)
7-11 1.19*** 0.73*** 0.15 78 0.54 0.78*** 0.22** 97
(0.35) (0.05) (0.15) (0.35) (0.07) (0.11)
All 0.67* 0.77*** 0.17*** 157 1.17*** 0.62*** 0.18 172
(0.35) (0.06) (0.07) (0.41) (0.10) (0.13)
nobs.: Number of observations with change in tentative quantity.
Table 9: OLS estimation of final revision behavior (clustered standard errors in parentheses).
*, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels.
stochastic revision where rival’s plans are observable and implementation of revisions is im-
perfect.
While real time revision markets are characterized by drastic upward adjustment in quan-
tity at the end of the revision phase, quantities start high and are adjusted downwards as
the revision phase progresses in the stochastic revision markets. As the revision phase nears
the end, players adjust quantities upward towards the static best response. Given that the
payoffs are determined by the quantities chosen at the last opportunity before the end of the
revision phase, lower quantities are implemented, thereby fostering collusion.
Our results on real time revision markets can be compared with Deck and Nikiforakis
(2012). We show that with perfect implementation of revised actions, having more infor-
mation is detrimental to the firms. This negative value of information runs contrary to the
result in Deck and Nikiforakis (2012) who study the minimum effort game in the laboratory.
They find that the coordination problem can be resolved by having the players revise their
actions in real time and letting them monitor each others’ action choices. The difference in
our result can be attributed to the strategic character of the two games. In coordination
games, there is a profile of actions that is Pareto efficient where none of the players have any
unilateral incentive to deviate. Players can completely get rid of the uncertainty about other
players’ actions with perfect monitoring. In contrast, in our study, the Cournot game has an
unique Nash equilibrium which is not efficient and at the most efficient action profile, each
player has an unilateral incentive to deviate. With perfect implementation of revisions, more
information does not help in achieving the efficient profile of actions, rather it serves as a
tool to deceive others.
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With stochastic revision, there is a positive value of information. Our findings indicate
that in order to achieve higher cooperation among players a game of quantity competition
between two firms, we do not need strong restrictions on the institution of revision as pre-
sented in Dorsey (1992) and Kurzban et al. (2001). These papers study the provision of
public goods in voluntary contribution games and find that provision is higher only when an
incremental revision mechanism is used where individuals can only revise their contributions
upwards. This enables individuals to make small commitments to the public good while
allowing them simultaneously to limit their commitments so that they can control the extent
to which they expose themselves to being free ridden. In our stochastic revision markets,
“commitment” is introduced through the imperfect probabilistic implementation of prepared
actions.
More generally, we show that cooperation can be observed even in one-shot games where
the static Nash equilibrium predicts no cooperation. In presenting experimental support for
the main theoretical result of Kamada and Kandori (2015), our research provides a justifica-
tion for the widely observed cooperation in the outside world, even when individuals interact
only once.
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APPENDIX (Not for Publication)
A Instructions to subjects
Thank you for agreeing to participate in this decision-making experiment. During the exper-
iment we require your complete, undistracted attention, and ask that you follow instructions
carefully. You should not open other applications on your computer, chat with other students,
or engage in other distracting activities, such as using your phone, reading books, etc.
You will be paid for your participation, in cash, at the end of the experiment. Different
participants may earn different amounts. What you earn depends partly on your decisions,
partly on the decisions of others, and partly on chance.
The entire experiment will take place through computer terminals, and all interactions
between you will take place through the computers. It is important that you not talk or in
any way try to communicate with other participants during the experiment.
During the instruction period, you will be given a complete description of the experiment
and will be shown how to use the computers. If you have any questions during the instruction
period, raise your hand and your question will be answered out loud so everyone can hear.
If you have any questions after the experiment has begun, raise your hand, and I will come
and assist you.
The experiment will consist of 11 matches. In each match, you will be matched with
one of the other participants in the room. In each match, both you and the participant you
are matched with will make some decisions. Your earnings for that match will depend on
both of your decisions, but are completely unaffected by decisions made by any of the other
participants in the room.
At the end of the experiment, you will be paid the sum of what you have earned in each
of the 11 matches, plus the show-up fee of $ 5. Everyone will be paid in private and you are
under no obligation to tell others how much you earned. Your earnings during the experiment
are denominated in points. At the end of the experiment you will be paid $1 for every 150
points you have earned.
The Structure of a Match
Every match proceeds as follows. You are matched with another person from the room at
the beginning of a match. Both you and the other person are sellers in a market producing
and selling the same product. Your decision is to choose the quantity of the product
to be produced and sold in the market. You can choose any number (up to one
decimal place) between (and including) 0 and 50.
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It costs 2 points to produce an unit of the product. Thus, if you produce q units, your
total cost is 2q points.
The total market quantity (Q) is the sum of the quantity chosen by you and the quantity
chosen by the other person. The price of the product depends on the total market quantity
according to the following rule. Whenever the total market quantity is less than or equal to
50, then the price of the product is 50 minus the total market quantity. However, if the total
market quantity exceeds 50, then the price of the product is zero. That is,
P =
50−Q Q ≤ 500 Q > 50
Your revenue is given by price times the quantity you produce and costs are 2 times the
quantity you produce. And, your profit equals your revenue minus your cost:
Profit = Revenue - Cost = (P − 2)∗(quantity produced by you)
In order to make an informed decision, each of you has been provided with a profit sheet
and your screen contains a profit calculator. The profit sheet shows the profit that you will
earn for every possible combination of integer choices (for 0 to 30). Each row in the profit
sheet refers to your quantity, and each column refers to the quantity produced by the person
you are matched with. For any combination of (integer) quantities chosen by you and the
person you are matched with, you find the corresponding cell to find the resulting profits. If
you wish to find out the resulting profits when you enter integer numbers above 30 or non-
integer numbers for your quantity and other person’s quantity, then use the profit calculator.
Here you can enter any number up to one decimal place between 0 and 50.
[The following paragraph only in the Baseline treatment.] You and the person you are
matched with will have 120 seconds to decide your quantities to be produced. At the begin-
ning of a match, each of you should enter an initial tentative quantity. After you enter an
initial tentative quantity, you will get to see your tentative quantity on your screen. How-
ever, you will not be able to observe the tentative quantity chosen by the person you are
matched with, your tentative profits and the other person’s tentative profits. Once everyone
in the room has entered a tentative quantity, the “120 seconds” timer starts. Remaining time
will be displayed on top of your screen. At any point, you can change your tentative quantity
(during the 120 seconds). Every time you make a change it is updated on your screen. The
word tentative reflects the fact that if there are no more changes then the last entry shows
your final quantity choice for the match. Your final quantity choice for the match is whatever
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your tentative quantity is at the end of 120 seconds. At the end of the 120 seconds you will
get to observe not only your own final quantity choice but also the final quantity choice made
by the person you are matched with. Depending on these quantity choices, you will then get
to know the profits earned by you and the profits earned by the person you are matched with
for the match.
[The following paragraph only in the Real Time Revision treatment.] You and the person
you are matched with will have 120 seconds to decide your quantities to be produced. At the
beginning of a match, each of you should enter an initial tentative quantity. After both of you
enter an initial tentative quantity, you will get to see your tentative quantity, the tentative
quantity chosen by the person you are matched with, your tentative profits and the other
person’s tentative profits on both of your screens. Once everyone in the room has entered
a tentative quantity, the “120 seconds” timer starts. Remaining time will be displayed on
top of your screen. At any point, you can change your tentative quantity (during the 120
seconds). Every time you or the person you are matched with makes a change it is updated
on the screen for both of you to see along with the tentative profits. The word tentative
reflects the fact that if there are no more changes then the last entry shows the final quantity
choice and the amount of profits you earn for this match. Your final quantity choice for the
match is whatever your tentative quantity is at the end of 120 seconds. Your earnings for
this match will be the tentative profits at the end of 120 seconds.
[The following two paragraphs only in the Stochastic Revision treatment.] You and the
person you are matched with will have 120 seconds to decide your quantities to be produced.
At the beginning of a match, each of you should enter an initial tentative quantity. After
both of you enter an initial tentative quantity, you will get to see your tentative quantity,
the tentative quantity chosen by the person you are matched with, your tentative profits and
the other person’s tentative profits on both of your screens. Once everyone in the room has
entered a tentative quantity, the “120 seconds” timer starts. Remaining time will be displayed
on top of your screen. At any point, you can change your tentative quantity (during the 120
seconds). Every time you or the person you are matched with makes a change it is updated
on the screen for both of you to see along with the tentative profits.
The word tentative suggests that the quantity choice is not the final choice for the match.
Your final quantity choice for the match is determined according to the following procedure:
After each second, the computer generates a random integer for each pair of matched par-
ticipants. This integer is drawn from a uniform distribution over [1,25]. If the integer drawn
is 1, then an “event” occurs. This means that every second the probability that an “event”
happens is 0.04 (as every integer is equally likely to be drawn). So on an average, an “event”
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takes place every 25 seconds. Of course this is just an average; this random number gener-
ation is independent across each second. Your final quantity choice for the match is
given by the tentative quantity corresponding to the last time an “event” hap-
pened before the “120 seconds time” ends. Your earnings for this match will be
the tentative profits corresponding to the last time an “event” happened before
the “120 seconds time” ends. Also note that if an “event” does not happen in the entire
“120 seconds time”, then the tentative quantity choices at time 1 (initial choices) will be
implemented as the final quantity choices. So, to summarize, whether or not you change
your tentative quantity is always in your “hands” but whether its implemented for the match
is dependent on the random occurrence of the “event”.
After a match is over we will go to the next match. You will be matched to a new
participant from the room. It is very important to note that you will not be
matched with the same person ever again. Every match proceeds according to exactly
the same rules as described above. When the 11th match is over, you will be paid the sum of
what you have earned in all matches plus the show up fee.
Before we begin with the experiment, it is important that you understand the range of
profits that you can earn depending on your quantity choice and the other person’s quantity
choice. For this reason, you will have two minutes before the start of the experiment to explore
different quantity combinations with the profit sheet and the profit calculator. During the
actual experiment, you are free to consult both the profit sheet and the profit calculator
whenever you wish.
B Profit Sheet
The profit sheets that were handed out to the participants are given in Figures B1 and B2.
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Figure B1: Profit Sheet - Page 1
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Figure B2: Profit Sheet - Page 2
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C User Interface
The user interface (screen display) for each of the three treatments is provided in Figures
C1-C3.
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 Figure C1: Subject screen for Baseline treatment
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 Figure C2: Subject screen for Real Time Revision treatment
32
 Figure C3: Subject screen for Stochastic Revision treatment
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